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CORRESPONDENCE 



IN REGARD TO 



V'l Battle of Corinth, Miss, 




W 



October 3d and 4th, 1862. 

MAJOR GENERAL C. S. HAMILTON, 

. i 
Late United States Art/iy, 



ARTHUR C. DUCAT. 






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iFrcm Chicago Tribune, Oct. /Sih, jSSt.] 



At the anniversary of the Battle of Corinth^ 
which was appropriately celebrated bj the old 
soldiers of this citj and vicinity on the evening 
of the 4th inst., Gen, C. S. Hamilton, of Mil- 
waukee, gave a very vivid account of the en- 
gagement, which resulted in a victory for the 
Union cause. Mr. Hamilton was a participant 
in the fight, and his position was such as to give 
\ m every facility for seeing all of the engage- 
lent and thoroughly understanding the events 
' at resulted in the battle. Owing to the crowded 
,'jlumns of 77(e Tribune the following day, there 
|jpeared only a brief summary of Mr. Hamilton's 
/aper. It is now given in full, as it is of historic 
Value. 

CoMR.\DEs : You will allow me to premise that 
m what I am about to say of the battle of Cor- 
inth, if there is more or less that is personal to 
myself, it is not because of any personal vanity, 
but because I cannot state the facts that should 
be known without some personal reference. I 
should be reluctant to say anything that might 
be construed as claiming for myself what might 
be accorded to others — but what is desired is to 
get at the actual facts. I may further say that 
the chief reason other than the one given is that 
I have again and again been besought to make 
public the truths that I am about to relate, while 
there are those living who can corroborate them, 
and that the true history of one of the most im- 
portant battles of the great Rebellion may be un- 
derstood. Most of the otlicers who took part in 
that War are beyond middle-age; indeed, the 
greater part are fast reaching the period of aged 
manhood. Every year greatly decreases the 
number of those who were active in the War, 
and but few years coniparatively remain to gather 
facts from the living actors. 

In order to understand the importance of the 
victory of Corinth, and its bearing on the 
fortunes of the War, we must look carefully over 
the whole theatre of the war at that time. It is 
not sufficient that we take into consideration the 
situation in the Valley of the Mississippi ; we 
must go further and examine the status of the 
contending armies stretching through the bor- 
der .States from the Mississippi to the Atlantic, 
and see what had been gained or lost in nearly 
two years of w-ar, by the armies of the North. 
It was the last important battle of 1S62 and vir- 
tually closed the campaigns of both Union and 
Rebel armies for that year. These campaigns 
opened with the brilliant victories of Forts Henry 
and Donelson; followed by the capture of Island 
Number Ten, and by the great battle of Shiloh 
and the occupation of Corinth and Memphis. 
These operations in the West may be summed 
up as follows: The Confederate armies had been 
driven from tlie Ohio River, almost out of the 



States of Tennessee and Kentucky, a steady 
ing back for a distance of 200 miles, the Fe 
occupation reaching the Gulf States, whert 
chivalrous foes had been sure a Yankee 
would never set foot. Our lines stretched 
Memphis through Corinth and Nashvil 
Kno.wille, EastTenn. In the Eastthe cam 
had opened by the advance of the Army 
Potomac to the Peninsula and toward Rich 
Right here let me say that if the Army 
Potomac had been pushed from the time it ocop- 
ped before Yorktown, with a tithe of th - energy 
and courage shown by Gen. Grant from the mo-\ 
ment his forces presented themselves in front o 
Fort Henry, the Rebel Capital of Richmonc 
would have fallen into our hands, as would havi 
the State of Virginia; and the theatre of wai 
would have been removed to the Cotton States, 
where it belonged. 

BUT THE CHILDISH DELAY 

before the insignificant works of Yorktown gave 
ample time for the Confederates to concentrate 
their strength, and win back by hard blows what 
thev had held so long with wooden guns in front 
of "Washington, but which they had been forced 
to yield by the flank movement to the Peninsula. 
A week of energy from the day the army came 
in sight of Yorktown, instead of a month of use- 
less delay, and Richmond would have fallen like 
a ripe pear. 

The country had been full of hope — a hop 
changed almost to despair through incompeter 
generalship. McClellan and his army \ver 
driven from the Peninsula, and Pope, in the gal- 
lant but vain endeavor to stem the tide of Con- 
federate victories, had been overcome in the Wil- 
derness. Buell had been forced back from Mid- 
dle Tennessee to Louisville, so that on the day of 
the battle whose anniversary we celebrate the 
Confederate armies occupied the line of the Po- 
tomac, as they did the day .-f'-r the ^..-f >..•»' "f 
Bull Run, aiid of all the territory gained by the 
operations of our great armies there remained to 
us from the Atlantic to the plains only that con- 
tiguous to the banks of the Mississippi from 
Cairo to Memphis. Those were glorious victo- 
ries for the Confederate arms, and filled the 
Southern heart with swelling pride and the full 
confidence of ultimate success. These achieve- 
ments in the East were but the heralds of what 
was confidently expected in the West. The Un- 
ion armies must be driven back to their own soil, 
and a mighty eflbrt was made to concentrate an 
overwhelming force of Confederates which 
should thrust the invaders back to the banks of 
the Ohio. 

Alone of all the territory gained at so much 
cost there remained to us only that of Western 
Tennessee and Kentucky ; and right here I think 
I hazard nothing in saying that a defeat at Cor- 
inth twenty years ago to-day would have let"t no 
considerable obstacle in the way for the Rebel 



to occupy again the line of tlie Ohio, 

jh, being done, all the blood and treasure in 

irly two years of war would have been wasted, 

1 the contending armies would have stood on 

ost the identical footing they occupied a year 

a half before. The hopes of the North had 

blasted by the failures in the East; the land 

filled with mourning, and the darkness of 

it and disappointment hung like a pall over 

''ree States. 

was amid this gloom that the battle of Cor- 
.vas fought against much greater forces, and 
tory won. It was a single star gleaming 
gh the darkness, but lighting up the heart 
'. Nation with hope and gladness. In the 
"ical strength of the forces engaged it did 
:nd with the battles of the Peninsula, but 
importance of its results and the magni- 
tude of its consequences it loses nothing when 
placed s'.de by side with any of the great battles 
of the War, excepting alone that continuous bat- 
tle which forced Lee to the surrender of his brave 
umy at Appomattox. The bravery with which 
t was tbught I do not believe has been surpassed, 
and the preponderance of the Rebel forces, nearly 
:wo to one, rarely happened during the War. 
You are proud to have been of that band; I am 
"oud to have borne a part, and yours and my 
lildren for generations to come will be proud of 
the part each of us shared in that memorable 
fight. I have little to say of the details of the 
engagement. You are all familiar with its main 
features, and more familiar with your own im- 
mediate surroundings. 

THERE IS, HOWEVRR, ONE IMPORTANT FACT 

not generally known, but with those who do 
\now it personally there can be but one opinion 
s to its bearing on the results of the battle. The 
ilan of the battle as fixed by Gen. Rosecrans on 
he morning of Oct. 3, and as detailed in his offi- 
;ial report, was for Davies' division to take the 
centre in front of Corinth; with McKean's divis- 
ion on his left, while Hamilton's division was 
thrown out on the Purdy road on the extreme 
right, as far as the outer Rebel intrenchnients, 
and nearly three miles from the town. Stanley's 
division was to the left and rear, and about as far 
from the town as Hamilton's, and held in reserve. 
Iluioliiuii i.as lO connect the left of his division 
with Davies' right, and tlius await the attack. 
Then when Davies' division was attacked, it was 
gradually to retire, and Hamilton and McKean 
were to fall on the Confederate flanks. In other 
words, the real battle was to be fought within a 
box, the front of which was open, and the enein3' 
was to be drawn in and crushed by the two sides. 
Now, there is no one so great a novice in war 
but will wonder at a plan of battle which, while 
it placed but a single division in the front of the 
enemy, with orders to retire when attacked, and 
thus allow an overwhelming force of the enemy 
to separate the other divisions, cutting the Fed- 
eral army in two parts. But such was the plan 
for the 3d of October and such was the plan for 
the 4th, but which was frustrated by the following 
incident: You all remember the change that 
was made in the positions of our troops during 
the night of the 3d; how Stanley's division was 
called in and occupied the earthworks ; how Da- 
vies' division was thrown back to and within the 



edge of the town; and that Hamilton's division 
was called in and occupied the rising ground on 
the north and northeast of the town, while Mc- 
Kean's troops were held partly as a reserve. 
And here is the way it happened. An attempt 
was made late in the afternoon of the 3d by Ham- 
ilton's division to attack the enemy's left flank, 
but which was thwarted by one brigade becoming 
separated from the other and becoming engaged 
with a watching party on the enemy's extreme 
left. The attack could not safely be made but by 
the whole division, and before the brigade could 
be withdrawn and got into supporting position 
night had come and the flank attack was frustra- 
ted. The threatened movement of the division 
had attracted the enemy's attention, and eft'ec- 
tually checked the forward movement of the 
Rebel army on Davies. The day closed then 
with Hamilton holding a position between tli 
Purdy road and the outermost Rebel intrencl 
ments, facing the enemy, but witli a dense fores 
tliick with undergrowth, between. Davies' di 
vision had fallen well back toward the town, am 
though fighting bra%ely, were forced back b 
many times their number. McKean's divisio. 
occupied a similar position on the extreme left, 
while between these two divisions of Hamiltoi 
and McKean lay the whole Rebel army, re, ^\• to 
spring upon the town in the morning. No orders 
had been received hv me from the General com- 
manding for several hours. 

About 9 p. m. his Chief of .Staff" brought me 
this order — to wit: "Place your batteries on the 
Purdy road at 10 p. m. and pla^' them tw-o hours 
in a northwest direction with shot and shell, 
where the enemy is massed, and at midnight at- 
tack them w'ith voin* whole division with the 
bayonet." The officer who brought that order 
and who took back my reply is Gen. A. C. Du- 
cat. I said, "Tell Gen. Rosecrans I cannot ex- 
ecute that order until I see him personally, and 
explain to him the difficulties in the way, and 
how it must result if carried out." An liour 
passed, and the officer who brought the order re- 
turned, l^ringing the commanding General. An 
officer of high rank (Gen. John B. Sanborn, of 
Minnesota), here to-night, and many others 
heard the following conversation : 

"Gen. Hamilton, what do you mean by diso- 
beying my order to attack the enemy.'" 

I replied: "Gen. Rosecrans, I am ready to ex- 
ecute your order; but there is too much at stake 
here to risk it by what must prove a futile attack, 
owing to the darkness and the dense forest, and 
it seemed a plain duty to explain to vou the posi- 
tion, and the result if your order is executed. 
The forest and undergrowth are so dense that my 
troops 

CANNOT RETAIN THEIR FORMATION 

for five minutes after they move. It is too dark 
to distinguish friend from foe, and my division 
once disorganized in the forest cannot be reformed 
for battle until morning. My troops are not in 
supporting distance of any others, and when the 
assault is made on the town your army will be 
cut in two as it is now, and will be destro3'ed. 
The troops should be drawn in and the divisions 
placed in front of the town within the earth- 
works, and in immediate support of each other. 
The position is a strong one, and if occupied we 



n 



shall win a viclorv ; if left as thev are now there 
is nothing before you but a terrible deleat." 

A moment of reflection, and then came tlie an- 
swer: "Hamilton, ^ou are right. Put your di- 
vision as your suggest; the others shall be placed 
accordingly." 

It w^as thus that the troops came to occupy the 
positions they did on the morning of this day 
twenty years "ago; thus that victory came where 
defeat was inevitable; thus that the territory to 
the banks of the Ohio was preserved to us, and 
the silver lining to the cloud showed itself to the 
whole people. It was but an incident, but big 
w'ith fate, and as such we must look back upon 
it with infinite satisfaction. 

And now before I close I must touch upon one 
jthtr matter— a matter of justice to those oflicers 
ind men who took part in the battle of luka. 
[All who fought at luka and lived were present 
\at Corinth, and so intimately were those battles 
Connected that I am not out of place in alluding 
/;o the former in what I now have to say. The 
.'battle of luka was fought on the lyth of .Sep- 
' tember, just two weeks preceding that of Cor- 
inth. It was a fierce contest — none more so. 
•he long list of dead and wounded, compared 
iith the number engaged, shows that for an ac- 
tion of two hours in length it was hotly contested. 
The still longer list of the dead and wounded of 
the enemy, with the number of prisoners taken, 
speaks louder than words of the bravery of our 
men. If men do well in the heat of battle and 
other men speak of them, just words should be 
spoken; sneers are unjust and out of place. 

In the first volume of Gen. Sherman's Mem- 
oirs, page 261 (writing of the battle of luka, the 
following passage occurs: "Price perceived his 
advantage and attacked with vehemence the head 
of Rosecrans' column, Hamilton's division, beat- 
ing it back, capturing a battery, and disabling 736 
men." And a little further on he says : "In my 
experience these concerted movements generally 
fail unless with the very best kind of troops," 
etc. Well, now, I believe Gen. Sherman is about 
the last man to do intentional injustice to any 



one, much less a soldier of the War of the P 
bellion; but look at it, turn it over, read it bai 
wards, any way, every way, and what does 
sound like, or look like, but a sneer. It is t 
this battle was not fought by him or his tro< 
He wa.s a hundred miles away; but if he 
fought it, or the men under his command 
fought it, there would have been at least a 

COMMENDATION OF THE BRAVERY SHOWI 

there would have been a memorandum, at ' 
to the effect that if a battery was lost, it w. 
captured, and was not lost. And further, I 
the troops were beaten back, they did not : 
them, or at any time, retire a half muske 
from where the line was formed and the 
fought. And as to the battery and the ,: 
men who worked it, he would at least ha 
the stoiv that e\"ery oflicer and nearly eve 
and horse w-as killed or wounded before t ^u 
fired the last shot, and fell into the enemy 'o' hands. 
And he would have further stated that, if he had 
736 men disabled, the enemy lost 1,438 men, and 
that on the whole it was a gallant fight, and that 
our men slept on the field and the enemy didn't, 
and finally would have indeed been angry if any- 
body else had sneered at it if it had been fought 
by his men. 

What would Gen. Sherman think and how 
would he feel if his "march through Georgia,'' 
his capture of Atlanta, Savannah, Charleston, 
Columbia, and the great "concerted movement" 
of his chief. Grant, and himself, which cornered 
the armies of the Confederacv in North Carolina 
and Virginia, without hope of escape — if history 
should allude to it only by his having so many 
thousand men disabled.? But then Gen. Sher- 
man had really "the very best kind of troops." 

Now let me say that Gen. Sherinan had no in- 
tention to be unjust, though he was unjust. No 
General is more willing to accord everything 
that rightly belongs, none less envious of his 
brother Generals, none froin whom justice 
springs more spontaneously than he. 



LETTER FROM ARTHUR C. DUCAL 



[Ffvm Chicago TrU'utu\ Oct. ^^th, 1SS2.\ 



Down'er's Grove, 111., Oct. iS. — In your issue 
of to-day under the above heading you published 
a paper read by Maj.-Gen. C. S. Hamilton, late 
U. S. A., at the anniversary dinner of the sur- 
viving officers of the battle of Corinth. Gen. 
Hamilton is represented as having read as follows : 

[The extract is to long to publish entire. It is 
the statement made by the essaj-ist that the plan 
of the battle embraced the retirement of Davies' 
division, when attacked, when Hamilton and 
McKean were to fall on both flanks of the enemy. 
This would have cut the Federal forces into three 
separated commands. Gen. Hamilton goes on to 
say that this plan was frustrated, and that he re- 
fused to obey the order of Rosecrans "brought 
by Gen. A. C. Ducat " to charge the enemy at 



night until the commanding officer could look 
over the ground. Gen Rosecrans, he says, came 
to his headquarters, looked at the situation, and 
placed the troops as Hamiton had suggested.] 

The "one important fact" stated by Gen. Ham- 
ilton has not been "generally known" and in that 
he is very right. From none of the 17,000 men 
of our army at Cornith is there, to the knowledge 
of the writer, any w"ord of record e\'en suggesting 
that there was any such plan of the battle of 
Corinth as described by Gen. Hamilton, and it 
will be a great surprise to the officers, who, it is 
supposed, should have a pretty intimate knowl- 
edge of the plans of the general commanding. 

Gen. Hamilton had the right of the line of 
battle on the morning of the third. That line 



n. Rosecrans in his report clearly gives his 
sons for. He did not know just where tlie 
•■my would strike him, and his small force of 
"■'airy was fully engaged as stated by him. His 
' I was therefore made to first check an advance 
°'i any of the roads leading to his position 
^ to the enemy, from the west, north, and 
'least, until the point of real attack could be 
' determined. All troops within supporting 
'Mce. As before stated, Gen. Hamilton was 
"■^e right, and it would be his duty to feel our 
"'f battle on his left and not lose it, and to use 
^scretion of a Major-General commanding a 
'°and fine division of a small army not in 
sbn of orders. The position of Gen. Ham- 
'. command at the early stage of the battle 
■'^important one. It guarded the right from 
'•"^k on a point where one might well be an- 
. .v.ip^. ';i, with no cavalry of our own on this 
front. "W-o attack having been made in that di- 
rection, there was still plenty of work for Gen. 
Hamilton, with his fine and brave division, even 
without orders, as the main body of the enemy 
had been hurled upon our center, held by the 
gallant division of Gen. Davies on the left of 
Gen. Hamilton, which he was supposed to have 
touched. The sight and noise of battle is always 
a pretty true guide to a soldier as to where he 
should go and where he belongs. Gen. Hamilton 
must not fall into the error that because Davies' 
division, after a most obstinate and gallant re- 
sistance, was obliged to fall back for awhile, that 
this was part of the "box" he describes, and a part 
of the plan he suggests as that of Gen. Rosecrans. 
If the foresight of the General commanding had 
been as good as Gen. Hamilton's backsight is 
now, and the enemy had been kind enough to 
inform him (Rosecrans)just what he was going to 
do, he might have made another order of battle, 
and it is possible, though not probable, that the 
enemy would have been repulsed on his first at- 
tacks, although he had the great advantage of 
being the attacking party, and an army of more 
than twice the number of men of ours. 

Tlie fact that the centre and left were being 
driven a little under vastly superior force, and 
the fact that Gen. Hamilton's division had not 
been and was not then engaged, was made known 
to the General commanding, and Gen. Hamilton 
"v" ""djrsJ. to ;.'tu^'K the enemy, the order reach- 
ing him in the afternoon. The attack was made 
with one brigade — Gen. Sullivan's — and did 
relieve the pressure on the left and centre, which 
were desperately fought and held by McArthur, 
Hackleman, Davies, Oglesbv, McKean, Stanley, 
Crocker, Mower, Smith, Fuller and others— fight- 
ing as they were with superior numbers — from 
early in the morning until late in the afternoon. 
The enemy made a partial change of front to 
resist Hamilton. 

As to the night attack mentioned by Gen. 
Hamilton as having been ordered by Gen. Rose- 
crans, the writer has no recollection of any 
such order or any such suggestion by the Gen- 
eral commanding. The only night attack he 
remembers being.talked of was the second night 
of the pursuit of the enemj', after the battle, when 
an attempt to overtake the enemy and attack him 
was talked of, but abandoned and not ordered. 



from the condition of the stock. Can Gen. Ham- 
ilton confound this with an order he supposed he 
received.' If Gen. Rosecrans ever contemplated 
a night atack on the night of the 3d surely his 
other Generals and commanding officers otherthan 
Gen. Hamilton, and some members of his staft', 
would be made acquainted with it. It is hardly 
probable that Gen. Hamilton's division, alone and 
unsupported would be ordered to make such an 
attack. Night attacks are not, under certain cir- 
cumstances, when well arranged and carried out, 
always such absurds things as Gen. Hamilton 
would lead his hearers and his readers to suppose. 
There were many times during our war when 
night attacks would have brought about good 
results. 

The proposed disposition of troops and plans of. 
battle for the 4th were made known to the writer' 
and other members of the staft" early in the even-1 
ing of the 3d, and instructions were given to assist [ 
[)ersonally in the dispositions and formations. I, 
am not aware of any change in the plans of the) 
General commanding later in the night. , 

The truth of historv will never 'oe arrived at from I 
the savings and writings of special and interested! 
eulogists, norby the soundingof their own praiscy, 
and deeds by those who cannot find, even in thei' 
days, a special eulogist for them. It is small 
glory tiiat can be gained by attacking the dead 
whose voices are silent forever, or those who by 
misfortune, or the chapter of circumstance, or the 
falling oft" of butterfly friends, or the stabs of false 
and ungrateful ones, are not in a position to de- 
fend themselves, and who have not the popular 
ear. 

Gen. Rosecrans is a great and successful 
soldier and a generous friend. Rich Mountain, 
Carnifax Ferry, luka, Corinth, Stone River, Tul- 
lahoma, Chattanooga, and Chicamauga would be 
gloi'v enough for one man, and would entitle 
him to the respect and gratitude of a people for 
what he has done in almost any other country 
or any other time, and it is not his fault that 
devotion to his family, sore affliction, and the 
necessity of earning a support, together with the 
sensitive nature that is to be found in men of 
his bravery and genius, have prevented him from 
being in the field to resist the attacks of calum- 
niators whose chief object seems to have been 
to filch his glory and build up their reputations 
on his deeds — and it ill becomes any man now, 
after twenty-two years, at a convivial meeting 
of his comrades on the anniversar}' of one of 
his great victories, to turn the occasion into one 
of attack upon his reason and his fame. To none 
was Gen. Rosecrans more generous in his words 
of praise than to Gen. Hamilton, and no man 
was more anxious to gain his good opinion than 
was the man who attacked him under such unwar- 
rantable circimistances and at such an ill-chosen 
time and place. Gen. Rosecrans is not quite a 
dead lion, though he has been kicked at with the 
characteristic meanness of those who only spurn 
when they fear no danger. I regret the occasion 
that impels me to impose upon you this letter. 
To use a vulgarism it is "written from the 
shoulder," and I trust my friends will so con- 
sider it. Arthur C. Ducat. 



[Front Milwaukee Sundny Telegraph, Nov. 11th, ISSS, 



Upon reading General Ducat's letter, General 
Hamilton made the following reply. Both letters 
will be read with deep interest by all who were 
engaged in the battle and the campaigns leading 
to it, as well as by all soldiers. General Hamil- 
ton's letter is as follows : 

Milwaukee, Oct. 28, 1SS2. 
The Chicago Tribune of the 25th inst. contains 
a letter from Arthur C. Ducat — a reply, he deems 
it — to a statement of historical facts made by me 
at the meeting of the surviving officers of the 
battle of Corinth on the 4th inst. No candid 
man who took the trouble to read that statement 
can find a word or sentence in it that can be con- 
strued into an attack on General Rosecrans. It 
was a severe but just criticism on his official acts 
as connected with that battle, and as it is only 
I comparatively recently that earnest eflbrts have 
been made to get at the true history of the chief 
aotles of the rebellion, the one who is cognizant 
of such facts and can substantiate them, should 
be reasonably free from censure and malice, if the 
facts bear hard upon the official record of the 
commanders most interested. If Gen. Rosecrans 
is the man I take him to be, he will be prompt to 
recognize and acknowledge what he knows to be 
true, but which his staft" officer takes upon him- 
self to deny ; 

.\ND WHAT .\ DENIAL. 

Part of it he forgets — does not recollect; an- 
other part cannot be so, forsooth, because, he 
does not know it to be so, and because he does 
not know it to be so, he is positive no one of the 
seventeen thousand officers and soldiers of the 
Corinth army ever heard of it. And not only 
does he take it upon himself to forget what he 
knows to be true, but in his sycophantic frenzy 
he bursts into a personal attack and talks blindly 
of "special and interested eulogists," "attacking 
the dead," 'butterfly friends," "false and ungrate- 
ful ones," "attacks of calumniators," "filch his 
glory and build up reputation on his deeds," 
"attack on his reason and his fame," etc., etc. 

Let all this go for just what Ducat thinks it is 
worth. 

■ With reference to the time and place of my 
statement, I can conceive of no fitter time and 
place than an anniversary meeting where officers 
had gathered to talk over their campaigns. 
Especiall}' was this the case in a meeting called 
(as the letters of invitation read) "to put this bat- 
tle' in its true place in history. 

In that statement I made a mistake. I hasten 
to correct it. I alluded to Ducat as chief of 
staffi He was not. In one of his dispatches 
dated on the day of the battle, addressed to me, 
he signs himself "Lieut. Col. and general officer 
of grand guards, outposts and pickets." Few 
officers could bear such a title — except in sec- 
tions. The honorable position of chief of staff 
was filled by Col. Kennett, an able and gallant 
officer. 

THE FACTS. 

On the morning of Oct. 3d, Gen. Rosecrans 



called his division commanders together 
headquarters, and laid before them the p 
battle as I stated it at the anniversary mi 
That plan embraced a flank attack by eii 
both McKean's and my divisions, as c 
stances would admit. The box was used ' 
an illustration of the plan. I used it be^ 
was convenient, terse and expressive, 
palliate it. Ducat could not have been pr 
that meeting or he would have been coi 
with the plan. Indeed, it is certain, aim 
he was not present, and that Gen. Rosei 
not deem it prudent to trust him with it 

The meeting was not a council. No o ^i wa 
asked for an opinion. Each received his instruc- 
tions and departed to his command without other 
thought than to do his best to carry out the plan 
of the general commanding. 

Now, it often happens that plans are laid that 
do not meet the exigencies of the case, and are 
abandoned, and others acted upon, and those 
abandoned are not mentioned in the reports of 
operations. Thus it happened to McKean, who 
being fronted by forces vastly superior, came so 
near being outflanked himself, that not only was 
his proposed flank attack rendered impossible, 
but it became neccessary to draw support to him 
from Stanley's division, which it was remember- 
ed was on the far left. This exigency left the 
flank attack then solely to my division on the ex- 
treme right. 

This flank attack was held back by Gen. Rose- 
crans until after 5 p. M., and then ordered by 
him. It was thwarted, as stated in my official 
report, by one of the brigades getting a long way 
out of place, by mistaking a watching party of 
the enemy for the enemy in force; and before the 
brigade could be recalled and got into position 
for attack, night had fallen. The original orders 
and dispatches governing all these matters are in 
my possession, subject to the perusal of any one 
interested. 

Now, as to the plan of battle remaining the 
same for the next day, let us consult, not Ducat's 
memory, but his records. Tn I::- 'cttorl.; ■. ' " 
the following language: "The disposition of the 
troops and plans of the 4th were made known 
to the writer and other members of the staft" early 
in the evening of the 3d, and instructions were 
given to assist personally in the formations. I 
am not aware of any change in the plan of the 
general commanding later in the night." 

Here is a record: 

Headquarters, Army of the Mississippi. 

7 p. M., Oct. 3d, 1S62. 

General: Throw out, promptly, videttes, pick- 
ets, grand guards, scouts in rear of (word il- 
legible) on your front and flanks. Pick up all 
the prisoners you can. Get all the information 
possible * * * During the night and coming 
daylight much will depend on the vigilance of 
outposts and guards. 

By order of Gen. Rosecrans. , 

Arthur C. Ducat, Lt. Col., chief of grand ' 
guards and outposts. 

To General Hamilton. 



es this look like a change of position early 
e evening? No thought of a change was 
intil Gen. Rosecrans came out on tlie heia 

p. M. 

e is another dispatch. 

II : 30 P. M. 
ERAL H.\milton: The general command- 
ihes you to have your change of front exe- 
■o-nieht and not by any means wait lor 
t The moon will furnish you snthcient 
Resp'y, S. C. Lyfokd, Act'g A. D. C. 
change was being made when this order 

Rosecrans, in his testimony before the 
»e on the conduct of the war, testihed as to_ 
f "I determined on a readjustment ol 
-'P- for a Hnal battle, making use ot what 
Jfront. .jtiie ;„ our new line of defense, (fortih- 
oations\".ose to the town) to prevent Hie e"emy 
from turning our right. Tins zcas nccomphshed by 
:> A. M. of the Mil.' . ^ , •- 

•^ But why repeat? There are living at least 
half a dozen officers who heard Rosecrans cen- 
sorious question on the field at 10 P. M. What 
do you mean by disobeying 

MY ORDER FOR A NIGHT ATTACK.'" 

heard the conversation that followed, heard the 
approval of this commander of the reasons for 
dec ining to make the attack until the interview 
could be had, and heard the orders given at tlie 
dose to put the wounded in the ambulance and 
start them with the ammunition wagons in ad- 
vance to be followed by the whole command, 
taking a circulitious route to conceal the move- 
ment from the enemy. . 

Ducat does not recollect any order for a mght 
attack It is passing strange that an officer can 
!"ryan order three^Biles after night, take back 
1 reply and still later in the night bring back his 
chie'f lad sit by his side, listen to the censoi-ious 
nuestions to the division commandei, heai the 
orders for the movement resulting Irom the in- 
terview, and remember nothing about it. t-ven 
if the order had been sealed, and the reply sealed 
so that he could know nothing ot the_ contents, 
the conversation which took place in his hearing 
should have carried to his obtuse ears a tuU un- 
derstanding of the order which was disobeyed 



It might have helped his memory had he been 
present at the anniversary meeting and heard the 
corroborative testimony of a distinguished othcer 
there present, and also present at the interview 
on the field: that ofllcer heard it all and does not 
hesitate to tell the truth. 

One does not know which to admire most, the 
convenient memory, or the assurance wilh which 
he discusses the science of war. Read his lucid 
remarks on night attacks and judge. 

But then Ducat is authority on night attacks, 
and was evidently suffering from one when he 
gave vent to his "slraight-from-the-shoulder let- 
ter " 

Corinth was a fortified place, rather an in- 
trenched camp; made so that it might be held by 
a smaller force against a greater one. It was the 
depot of supplies for a great part of Grant s army, 
and was of the utmost importance. Now it was 
not only reasonable to suppose, but it was certain, 
if the enemy attacked it, he would do so with 
such a preponderance of force as to give reason- 
able hope of overcoming the garrison, and also ^ 
the fortifications. c ■ i 

In the li"ht of this fact, the wisdom of going ( 
outside the fortified lines to fight a battle, raav^ 
well be questioned. ^>;. 

The first dav's fight was in the open field, and . 
that the plan was to fight the battle there on the 
second day, Ducat's order is convincing. 

The whole plan of fighting in the open field 
was a mistake, but all honor to General Rose- 
crans for instantly abandoning his mistaken plan, 
and correcting liis error as rapidly as possible 
when he found it out, which he did not do until 
his order for a night attack had been disobeyed, 
and he was given the reasons therefor. 

It does not detract from Gen. Rosecrans ability 
that he made a mistake. 

"Show me the commander who never made a 
mistake, and I will show you a fool, or a man 
who never made war," was the utterance of one 
of history's greatest chieftains. 

Ducat savs: "Rosecrans is not quite a dead 
lion." Granted. But there must have been a 
dead lion around somewhere or the ^"thor of 
that phrase would not so readily have tound the 
skin of one to crawl into. ^ ^_ Hamilton. 



LETTER FROM ARTHUR C. DUCAT, 



[From Milwaukee Sunday Telegraph, Dec. lyt/i, /SS2.] 



Downer's Grove, Illinois, Dec. 7, 1S82. 
To the Editors of The Sunday Telegraph: 

Upon my return from an absence, my attention 
has been called to a letter from Maj. Gen. C. S. 
Hamilton, late U. S. A., published in your issue 
of Nov. 12, 1SS2, purporting to be a reply to an ar- 
ticle of mine in the Chicago Tribune of 25th Octo- 
ber, 18S2, under date of iSth of that month, and 
kindly republished b)' j'ou beside Gen. Hamil- 
ton's repl}'. The article was written in reply to 
a speech made, or a paper read, at an anniversary 
dinner of surviving officers of the battle of Cor- 
inth, Miss., at Chicago on the 4th of October, 
1SS2, by Maj. Gen. Hamilton, and published in 
■.the Chicago Tribune, Oct. iS, 1SS2. I have been 
{thus particular about the dates of the publication 
pf Gen. Hamilton's paper, or speech, and the pub- 
lications of the various documents since, that 
3en. Hamilton's important contribution to the 
history of the war may not be lost sight of, but 
may be found and read hy all who are interested. 

Gen. Hamilton, with an utter want of the dig- 
nity that should characterize a major general, 
having stooped to personal abuse and vitupera- 
tion, should not have from me the consideration 
of a reply, were it not improper to permit that 
his outrage on historj- should remain uncontra- 
dicted in any record where it may have found 
place. 

Referring particularly to the documents men- 
tioned, let us take this letter of Gen. Hamilton's, 
published in your issue of 12th Nov., 1882, to 
pieces and see what it is made of. Gen. Hamil- 
ton finds that his attack on Gen. Rosecrans was 
not under the circumstances of time, place, oc- 
casion, or after twenty years, or in any other 
way, as popidar as he expected, but it is charac- 
terized by all true soldiers and gentlemen as 
cowardly, ungrateful and a wretched piece of 
egotism in the worst possible taste, and he says: 
"No candid man who took the trouble to read 
that statement can find a word or sentence in it 
that can be construed into an attack on Gen. 
Rosecrans." This has no argument in it. Every 
man who read the "statement" will think for 
himself; it will present itself to different minds 
in different ways, and has little to do with history. 
It would be interesting, however, to know what 
candid gentlemen would say of it, and it is to be 
hoped that they will record their opinions. 
"the facts." 

The plan of the battle, as stated by Gen. Hamil- 
ton at tire anniversary meeting, he does not even 
pretend to prove in his letter. The "box" may 
be "convenient, terse and expressive," (how 
could it be otherwise,) but the re-assertion of the 
general is good for nothing, now, without the 
proofs. It would be a mere contest as to who 
would have the last word, without proper court of 
inquiry, and the writer desires to say that he has 
neither the time nor tlie inclination to engage in 
such wars of words. 



Gen Hamilton, after waiting twenty 
tells the extraordinary and unsupported 
ofthe plan, "the box" and the proposec 
attack" which surprise the living actors 
inth, are contradicted by me, and the bi 
proof is squarely on his shoulders. I 
seen, too, that his statements go into th 
for history side by side with their re' 

Let us see what Gen. Rosecrans s. 
port dated 2Sth Oct. 1862, only twenty 
after this battle. Writingof the situation .01 
battle he says: "There being indicatio-.s of apt 
sible attack on Corinth immediately, the follow 
ing disposition of troops will be made: Gen Mc 
Kean with his division will occupy the presen 
position. Gen. Davies will occupy the line be 
tween the Memphis and Columbus road. Ger 
Hamilton with his divison will take position bi 
tween the rebel works," (the writer will statt 
here, that when the rebel works, or breastworks, 
or fortifications are referred to, they mean the 
old works of the enemy constructed when they 
held Corinth,) "on the Purdy and the Hamburg 
roads: and Gen. .Stanley will hold his division in 
reserve at or near the old headquarters of Gen. 
Grant." Observe here that the division of Gen. 
Stanley in reserve was in Corinth. Did this look 
like an intention to fight the battle in the open 
field.' No. 

Gen. Rosecrans proceeds: "These dispositions 
were made, and the troops, at 9 o'clock on the 
morning of the 3d, occupied the position shown 
on the accompanying map. Hamilton on the 
right, Davies the center, McKean, the left with an 
advance of three regiments of infantry and a sec- 
tion of artillery under Col. Oliver on the Chewalla 
road." Here is the line of battle thrown out to 
develop and feel the attack of the enemy; Gen. 
Hamilton had the right ofthis line. 

General Rosecrans furthermore says: "The 
general plan which was explained to the division 
commanders verbally in ti'.e inut.iii.t;, %. .. j ,.^ 
hold the enemy at arms length by approaching 
him strongly," [Gen. Hamilton did not approach 
him at all] "and when his force became fully 
developed and had assumed a position, to take a 
position which would give us the use of our bat- 
teries," [our batteries were in the town of Corinth 
and some of them back of it from the front of the 
enemy's attack] "and the open ground in the 
vicinity of Corinth." 

Does this not carry with it conviction.' There 
was no open ground except in Corinth and im- 
mediately under the earthwork batteries in Cor- 
inth and such ground as had been cleared for 
their range. This disposes of Gen. Hamilton's 
"box" unless the one he has gotten himself into. 
But let us proceed. 

Referring to Col. Oliver's position, before men- 
tioned, and Gen. McArthur having been sent to 
the front and the widespread skirmishing in that 
direction reported by him, General Rosecrans 
says: "But it proved that Gen. McArthur had 



> 



10 



I up four more regiments from McKean's di- 

1," (this means in addition to the tliree regi- 

« under Col. Oliver) "and was contesting the 

gjd almost for a hattle," (just like McArthur.) 

g s this which induced Gen. Davies to ask per- 

,j,n to rest his right on tlie rebel entrench- 

p and to which I consented, adding the ver- 

g er to Lieut. Col. Ducat that he might use 

Igment about his leaving his present for 

j.iition." 

;(,writer has given the abo\e paragraph to 

Q tliat if there was a "box" plan, he would 

1; • have known something of it even thougli 

^ytiilton indicates that Gen. Rosecrans 

•hfjvould not trust him. 

.jyej me details of the battle — it had now 

j{ .ijt and desperate resistance against a 

>(ierior force, Gen. Rosecrans says: "Or- 

, w_ {accordingly given for McKean to fall 

ack to the next ridge," (McKean was well out to 

.he front,) "beyond our intrenchments, to touch 

,his right on Davies' left, for Stanley to move north- 

jward and eastward to stand in close echelon, but 

nearer town. Gen. Hamilton" (he had not been 

"^Migaged,) "was ordered to face toward Chewalla 

](«(/ moi<e do-vn until his left reached Davies' 

flight" — now mark this above order. 

The senior stalf officer.on duty on the right of 
the line of battle of the'^troops engaged, found 
that Gen. Hamilton was not supporting or en- 
gaged, and that he did not touch Davies, nor had 
he touched Gen. Davies' right, as it would have 
been his clear duty to do, even if he had not been 
ordered to do so, as he liad, and held the right of 
, the line, and on going to find luim, found that the 
enemy had actually deployed a heavy flanking, 
well supported skirmish line between his left and 
Gen. Hamilton. 

Gen. VanDorn, the rebel commander, and 
members of his staff told the writer a couple of 
weeks after, when he had the honor of being de- 
tailed to bear a flag of truce to the army of the 
enemy, "that they did not know that Gen. Hamil- 
ton was on their left until the afternoon" It looks 
as if Gen. Hamilton, to say nothing of his not 
flghting the enemv, was likely, and the only one 
at all likely, to get into his "box." The gallant 
troops engagixi were doing splendidly, though 
flghting such terrible odds, and entirely unsup- 
poiteu on tile ri^nt. It was a most unequal bat- 
tle at this time; it will not be thoiiglTt an exag- 
geration if it is stated that lo.ooo of our men 
were fighting 30,000 of the enemy, or in that pro- 
portion for six hours. 

The leelings of the officers and men of Gen. 
Hamilton's fine division can be appreciated; they 
must have thought the battle was to be tbught 
without them ; though they were very near the 
enemy, and the tide of battle had swept by their 
front, not a ".Springfield" shot from their position. 
Now here is richness, soldiers read this: Gen. 
Hamilton says, in what is likely to be his famous 
anniversary speech or paper: "An attempt was 
made late in the afternoon of the 3d bv Hamil- 
ton's division to attack the enemy's left flank, but 
which was thwarted by one brigade becoming sep- 
arated from the other, and becoming engaged 
with a 'watching party' on the enemy's extreme 
left. The attack could not safelv be made, but by 
the whole division, and before the brigade could 



be withdrawn and got into supporting position, 
night had come on and the attack was frustrated." 

The writer don't believe there is in the record 
of the war such a confession of weakness, and 
such a wretched attempt to bolster up a failure 
to obey instructions, and not perform the clear 
duty of a general to keep his touch on the line of 
battle on his flank, and to fail to march with the 
instincts of a soldier to the music of battle as this 
one. Who, pretending to be a general, would not 
have found out for himself the situation, but this 
one.' How necessar)' General Hamilton finds it, 
after twenty years, toattempt to "mend his fence!" 
He talks as a guilty man will talk of, and return 
to the place of his crime. Is this the true reason 
for his attack on General Rosecrans, this fear of 
truth and right, the facts of this part of the his- 
tory of Corinth.'' 

Gen. Hamilton, towards the close of his letter, 
becomes magnanimous to Gen. Rosecrans, says 
he made a mistake and forgives him, (what a 
blessed thing for Rosecrans,) with a quotation, 
author not given; can it be Hamilton.' 

Here is a quotation from ''The Memoirs of Na] 
polean Bonaparte" by the Count LabedoyerP 
London Geo. Virtue 26 Ivy Lane, Paternoste^ . 
row, 1S39 — vol.2, page S79. It is given fortliCi 
benefit of Gen. Hamilton, though no comparison 
is made or intended between the men. Labedoyere 
says, writing of Waterloo: "In regard to Marshal 
Grouchy, it appears, comformablv with the first 
orders given, that he confined himself to observ- 
ing the Prussians on tlie iSth, (the day of Water- 
loo.) At nine in the morning, he had quitted his 
cantonments to march for Wavres, and, on reach- 
ing Walhain, he lieard the connonading at Mont 
St. Jean, when the increasing briskness left no 
doubt but it was a very serious aftair. General 
Excelmans proposed marching by the right bank 
of the Dyle. 'Do you not feel,' said he to the 
marshal, 'that this cannonading makes the ground 
tremble under our feet. Let us march straight 
forwards to the battle.' The marshal, however, 
continued his slow movements," (our general did 
not move at all,) "and at two o'clock arrived at 
Wavres. At seven he received orders trom the 
major-general to march to .St. Lambert and at- 
tack Bulow, which step ought to have been sug- 
gested to him before by the tremendous cannona- 
ding at Waterloo." 

There are several quotations from Napier's his- 
tory of the Peninsular war that would fit this 
case, if there was time and space. 

Reference to Gen. Logan's able reply to Gen. 
Grant's plea for I'itz John Porter shows some pas- 
sages as peculiarly applicable to the conduct of 
Gen. Hamilton on the first day of the battle of 
Corinth. Reference is made to the action of one 
of Logan's brigades on the flank of the enemy 
and its results. Hamilton did not deem it safe to 
do anything with less than his whole division, 
and then under a special command to attack. 

The well known tact that Gen. Hamilton did 
no fighting on this first day, which covered w-ith 
glory the gallant troops of the divisions engaged, 
had much better for him have been left a simple 
record than in the shape he has put it in now, 
and in his attempt to filch glorv out of worse 
than nothing, he evidently has forgotten the story 
of the frog in the fable. 



/ 



/ 



11 



The stafl'ofBcer/Who discovered that Gen. Ham- 
ilton was not supporting, and that there was a 
skirmish line between him and our lighting right, 
promptly reported the tact to Gen. Rosecrans, 
and rode through that skirmish line when he car- 
ried Gen. Hamilton his order to do something. 
Gen. Hamilton sent one brigade, (Sullivan's) in 
the direction indicated by the staff ofticer, and it 
struck the skirmish line immediately. 

"h.\milton's w.\tching party." 

The next brigade, (Buford's,) was sent forward, 
and, like the gallant gentleman that he was and 
is. Gen. Buford eagerly moved forward to the 
front, but without proper instructions as to the 
direction that he was to take. The staff" officer 
asked Gen. Hamilton "if this brigade was going 
to Bolivar or to attack the enemy," whereupon 
Gen. Hamilton, not going forward and leading 
' the brigade to support Sullivan, recalled it and 
■\fient it again in the direction Sullivan's brigade 
\vas sent. Gen. Hamilton did not leave his posi- 
tion, but remained with his 3d brigade, and the 

Ittle was over from the darkness. Neither brig- 
tie struck the enemy in any force; in fact there 
'as no exchange of shots that day by Gen. Ham- 
■ ilton's division of thif-.-iTiall army of 17,000 men, 
but by Sullivan's bft6;ide with the "watching 
party" as described by Gen. Hamilton himself 

Gen. Hamilton says: "Now as to the plan of 
battle remaining the same for the second day, let 
us consult not Ducat's memory but liis records." 
Gen. Hamilton quotes an order of Gen. Rose- 
crans, signed b\- the writer, "to picket his front 
and flanks, pick up prisoners, and get all the in- 
formation possible." Good Heavens! what Gen- 
eral with the knowledge of what happened to 
Gen. Hamilton on the 3d, would not deem this 
necessary in his case, and what staff officer would 
be worthy the name who would not, with what 
he knew, suggest it to his chief Where is the 
proof in this of anything, only that it was deemed 
advisable to look' after Gen. Hamilton and see 
that he performed a duty know-n as necessary 
by every novice. Then Gen. Hamilton reviews 
an order from Gen. Rosecrans to which he at- 
taches weight. The order is signed by now Col. 
Lyford, Assistant Chief of Ordinance, U. S. A., 
at Washington, D. C. It says: "The Genera! 
commanding wishes you to have your change 
of front executed to-night and not by any means 
to wait for daylight. The moon will furnish you 
sufficient light." What does this prove or mean 
only that Gen. Rosecrans had made dispositions 
and given orders, and desired them completed 



and executed before daylight, at which time 
might look for a re-opening of the battle, 
that this spur to Gen. Hamilton, considering 
inactivity on the jd, was needed; only this, 
nothing more. Did Gen. Rosecrans ever sa) 
he had not determined on a readjustment f 
lines made first to feel the enemy, and 
strongly enough to draw him under the de 
of Corinth, and maintained by necessity frt 
fierce attacks of such an overwhelming 
upon only half of his army.' His original pi 
to fight on his inner line, under his batte 
the open ground and range of hills on th( 
(See his report.) 

If Gen. Hamilton had been in the Hi 
tie where he belonged, and it had been 
fallen back and he with it, and under 
we would have been in the chosen pc 
first day, (the 3d,) but instead of that 
be looked for, hunted up, and not le 
he had gotten to, and would have r 
put in a "box." 

Yes, "why repeat.'" The absurd 
"night attack" calls for no more att 
that subject I am entirely unanswere 

The writer had the honor early in 
of the 3d, of receiving from Gen. R 
instructions as to the disposition o 
the line of battle for the 4th, and w 
with the making of such disposition 
tion of positions on the left center ana 
Gen. Rosecrans in person giving his atten^ 
the disposition of the troops on the right center . 
right wing, in which he was engaged till 3 o'cloi 
A. M. on the 4th, at which hour the writer reported 
to him and explained on the map of the position 
what had been done, and where each command 
was, and received his approval. 

The rest of Gen. Hamilton's letter is taken up 
with most unbecoming personal references, and a 
miserable and slangy attempt at wit and ridicule 
mixed with low insinuations, to which I have 
neither cause or inclination to reply, and in which 
the reader can take no possible interest, only to 
regret it, if he should be Gen. Hamilton's friend. 

In connection with this letter, the writer re- 
grets two things: That it was necessary, from 
Gen. Hamilton's action, to in any way introduce 
the personal pronoun, or lo tr^- '-ile you wirh the 
length of this epistle, found difficult to curtail 
and do the subject fair justice. 

"It was a famous victory." 

Arthur C Ducat. 



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